Markets | Trading the "Bond Bubble"

One of the most confusing conundrum in recent time has been the curious case of stubbornly weak inflation and upbeat economy with low unemployment.

The US GDP number, while not spectacular, has been solid. Atlanta Fed GDP-Now picked up significantly in recent time. The consensus forecast for medium term GDP (2018) also improved from the start of the year and now stands at 2.3 percent. Unemployment rate remains near record lows, below pre-crisis number. According to JOLTS surveys, both quit rate and job opening rate matches or betters the pre-crisis cyclical highs. Even the relatively more pessimistic Fed labor market conditions index has improved significantly from the lows of early 2016. But both market and survey based inflation expectations are going the other way. The 5y treasury break-even inflation came-off ~40bps from highs of early this year and now stands at 1.65 percent. Similar is the story for break-even swaps markets. To match, the medium term consensus inflation forecast has come down from 2.4 percent early this year to 2.2 percent. The fall is even steeper for 2017 forecast, from 2.5 percent as recent as April, it is now at 2.10 handle. And this does not appear to be driven by oil or commodities. Both Brent and WTI have been range-bound since mid of last year. Even the set-back in general commodities prices (see Bloomberg Commodity or CRB index) early this year is now on the path of recovery. The Phillips curve is either flat, dead or was never there.

This conflicting development seemed to have a win-win impact on major asset markets. Instead of the fabled great rotation, we have seen strong money flows in both stocks and bonds - blame it on the re-balancing of portfolios, or general optimism.

The stock market benefited from solid economy and strong earnings, with valuation also supported by low rates. But the positioning remains cautious (with a correction in the gamma positioning as well).

A more interesting development is happening in the bonds markets. The bonds markets seem to have sided with the low inflation view - that no matter what the Fed does - inflation, and rates, are not going anywhere anytime soon. The over-all positioning remains solidly in the long territory. But the peculiarity is in the strong flattening bias build-up. Early this year we saw a massive swing in long maturity bonds positioning, from extreme shorts to moderate longs. This was presumably driven by the built-up and subsequent unwinds of the Trump Trade. As a side-effect, this has resulted in the extreme flattening positioning on the street. It appears everyone is positioned for a low pace of rate hikes from the Fed, and anchored low inflation expectation - resulting in a yield curve flattening. Last few times we had this kind of extremes (early 2010, mid 2012, around just before Taper tantrum and start of 2015) we had a very strong steepening that bloodied all these speculative position well and good.

Most of the players in the markets are already wary of overall bonds positioning. Some are calling out a bond bubble. Some are ready to take the opposite view. If you are in the markets to trade and not for punditry, it is hard to take a strong view. This extreme positioning in the curve provides a cheap (in terms of risk to reward ratio) way to position for a bonds sell-off. Or forget bursting the bubble, even a Fed balance sheet normalization can be the trigger. It is not at all certain balance sheet normalization will lead to increase in term premia and long term yields. But most theories say so. And if the Fed decides to hold short term policy rates during this normalization, this steepening can play out in both bull or bear scenario. And honestly, nobody has any clue how the Chinese are going to change their treasury buying patterns after the National Congress in the Autumn. If the current premier is able to stamp his authority, as generally expected, this may mark a definitive shift in policy from GDP growth target to economic stability. That, in turn, will have far reaching ripples for global asset markets.

At current level, the US curve is the flattest among all major currencies (except 5 year vs. 10 year area where JPY curve is flatter). A steepening in USD rates is a highly asymmetric trade - the trade to position for a bond bubble, whether you believe in it or not.

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1. Data source: ICI for funds flow data, CFTC commitment of traders for positioning data (latest 1st August)
2. Steepening position is implied from short end (2 year and 5 year) and long end futures positioning, expressed in equivalent (approximate) duration at 10 year point.

Macro | 2017 - The Year Ahead

2016 has been the year of surprises - The Brexit, the US Presidential election, the Italian referendum, the massive de-monitization in India, the Nobel prize in literature - you name it. But perhaps the real surprise was how the markets shrugged off each of these supposedly to catastrophic events.

As discussed earlier, this year has been the year of the dollar. The chart below on the left compares volatilities across asset classes in terms of cumulative daily moves greater than 1.5x the daily standard deviation. The dollar has been the clear winner. But also notice the sharp pick up in rates (US 30y here) late this year, reflecting the sell-off after the US election. The chart on the right shows the reversal and continuation of trends across asset classes during the year. The solid performance of risk assets after the sell-off early in the year, in spite of the dollar rally, increase in yields and continued weakness in the Chinese Yuan, has been nothing short of unexpected.

Going in to the next year, however, much of it depends on the performance of the US economy - more specifically the continued strength of the private consumption components and the much expected revival of the investment expenditure. The charts below show what to expect in each of these going in to 2017. A simple linear model points to the strong dependence of the house prices, real rate and labor productivity. The biggest risk to this component of GDP from rising rate is the house price, which has been strong in 2016. The upside risk is of course a much awaited improvement of the productivity (without a runway inflationary pressure).

The investment expenditure, on the other hand, is largely driven by the inflation (NOT real rate, based on this empirical AR(1) model) and expectation about the economy (here represented by the Conference Board leading Index for the US). This part will be crucially determined by the policies of the new administration. The built-up expectation about fiscal spending and its impact on keeping the US growth engine running I think is a bit over-rated. In fact fiscal stimulus in an economy with tight labor market can be more inflationary than expected. The biggest upside may possibly be in the private investments front, which has been running remarkably low for a recovery compared to past episodes. A judicious mix of policy can change this. An improvement in tax regime and infrastructure spending may make US assets attractive not only for domestic, but also for overseas investors. On the other hand, the storm kicked up over trades and foreign policies can be unsettling for long term investments. This is too early to conclude in either way - but this will definitely be the major source of risks, either good or bad. And if this hypothesis is true, this will mean a decoupling of the movement of rates, risk assets and dollars, conditional on no extraordinary increase in inflation or inflation expectation.

The last bit about contained inflation is the base case scenario. Over-all 2016 has seen global inflation picking up in the second half of the year. This to a large extent is driven by the recovery in energy prices and commodities in general. We are still to see any thing on the core inflation that will be any cause of concern. In fact global core inflation is down marginally in the second half in 2016, with notable exception of China. The medium to long term inflation forecast remains stable. The recent rally in inflation break-even markets, while impressive, is coming off from a very low level. We have discussed before the weakening relationship of wage pressure and headline inflation. Nevertheless wage growth is least of any concerns. We do have decent growth in wages in the US, but they are hardly extraordinary compared to pre-crisis periods, and elsewhere globally it remains subdued.

2016 has also been remarkable in at least two other aspects. First, we have seen a definite improvement in global PMI, not only limited to the US anymore. And also the significant contraction in US (negative) current account balance since the post-crisis QE world has now turned a corner and we have a marginal expansion in US current account deficit again. This is all the while with an expansion of Chinese current account surplus along with strong Euro area balance and contraction in current account surplus in petro-dollars economies. If the recent recovery of oil prices sustain, we will see the last bit changing in to positive territories again. That leaves the post-crisis anomaly of the very large Euro area surplus. The global imbalance in trade (and alternatively net savings) is shown the chart below on the left. During the 2000s, the US consistently ran an increasing current account deficit and a shrinking interest rate differential (see the right hand chart below, weighted rates differential to Euro and Japan economies). The dollar more or less followed the suit, weakening during most part of early 2000s. If we assume the QE is more or less done for the ECB and in 2017 we will focus back on tapering in the base case scenario, then it is hard to see that rates differential widening any further. Add to this the massive current account imbalance of the Euro area, and 2017 might as well be the turn-around year for the Euro, instead of the consensus long dollar trade (barring political accidents).

Finally, one of the biggest anticipation in 2017 is the great asset rotation, investors fleeing the bonds universe from the rising rate fear and piling in to equities. Again, there is hardly a strong case for that. Firstly, the demographics in the developed world does not allow a strong return to equities. Secondly, the fear about overseas official accounts dumping treasuries is largely unfounded - primarily most of them have been snapped up by the private sectors, and if we have steady energy prices we will see a lot less selling of treasuries by the petro-dollar economies. China, of course remains vulnerable with a steady outflow, but the outcome is unexpected here. A large dumping of treasuries by China, driven by PBoC's need to supply dollar demand in the domestic economy, will mostly be a risk-averse move and will have the opposite effect on US yields than what a large sell-off might suggest (i.e. a flight-to-safety rally instead of a bonds sell-off). As far as the US households are concerned, they started the great rotation a while back already - as the chart below show.

Overall, we can conclude from above that the major macro drivers for 2017 will be 1) US house prices and US fiscal and trade policies 2) Euro area economic indicators, especially credit impulse 3) The uncertain role of the emerging market economies in face of rising rates and dollars and finally 4) The re-balancing of global excess savings. We should expect a limited rise of rates and inflation (and inflation expectation). Also risk assets face no immediate strong head-winds yet as we expect the upside risk to bond yields and inflation limited. Finally, as we near the end of monetary activism and divergence, going forward we will see a higher de-correlation among asset classes. The major tail risks remain the Chinese economy - where expected risks of accident are low (but with a large impact of course). Among idiosyncratic risks, the UK economy may be vulnerable to a dragged-on negotiation on Brexit, which also potentially may have some mirror impact on the Euro area.

Given this, here we list the top macro trades for the coming year. Note these are the major themes and ways to express them, not a fire-and-forget strategy to be executed on the first trading day of the year.

Economic Theme	Market Impact	Trade
US Policy Regime Shift – pro-business (tax friendly), pro-fiscal (infra spending) with a risk of foreign confrontation	Macro: Consumption (and employment) has limited upside, the main upside lies in investment pick-up. Downside for house prices and trades Market: Selectively positive for equities, negative for rates, Limited upside for dollars.	Pay USD rates against GBP Long equity options with knock-out on lower rates Forward vol around (1y5y5y or similar) through vol-triangle, or simply 1y5y vs. 1y10y vol spread to protect against unexpected inflation/ sharp bear flattening. Rates receivers with lower rates knock-in for hedging economic shocks (long equities hedge, positive carry on upper left on forwards levels)
European/ Global   Recovery	Macro: higher rates, higher Euro (against USD and GBP) and higher inflation – with political surprise downside for Euro Area. Normalization of EU trade balance.	Long Euro FX calls with knock-in on higher rates GBP vs. EUR inflation breakeven tightener (pay GBP breakeven) Opportunistic rates steepener convergence
Brexit Implication	Unsustainably high priced-in inflation in UK. Equities so far priced-in only sterling weakness (FTSE in dollar terms sold off same as GBP since Brexit, this does not incorporate any weakening of the economy)	Short FTSE 100 quantoed in euro vs. SX5E or beta-weighted SX7E (highly correlated to Euro rates) GBP vs. EUR inflation breakeven tightener (pay GBP breakeven)
China Put	A flare up of Chinese crisis. Chinese market prices more controlled, than dependent countries	China rates payer vs AUD Short EM bonds (especially if you see a strong dollar rally ahead of us)
EM underperformance	Dollar strengthening, and economies closely linked to dollar following the rates moves	Buy dollar against EM CCY basket Short EM bonds (especially if you see a strong dollar rally ahead of us)
Euro Area Crisis Hedge	Reversal of peripheral spread tightening	Long Germany break-even vs. Italy (follows  closely the CDS spread)
Run-away inflation cheap hedge	The (unlikely) scenario of central banks losing control or way behind the curve. The idea is while normal inflationary pressure will push real yields, runaway inflation will force monetization, given the debt-to-GDP ratios of major economies.	near-OTM rates payers vs. inflation, against far-OTM inflation caps against rates.

Have a great year ahead!

Macro: The End of QE-topia

Negative rate is much more than what it says on the label. One of the cornerstones of modern finance is what is called present value (PV). PV is used to evaluate real projects, value financial investments or price derivatives, you name it. Surprisingly, based on my personal experience, it appears many practitioners and investors are unaware of the fundamental assumption on which this all encompassing concept of PV is delicately balanced - an assumption of a properly functional lending and borrowing market. Without that, there is no mean to transfer values across time back and forth, and PV loses its real meaning. Negative rates makes one question the validity of this assumption.

Central banks, it appears, are having a hard time. Last week's BoJ's underwhelming policy outcome was scorned off by the markets with an emphatic rally in Yen and sell-off in JGBs. This week BoE is widely expected to kick-in with some Brexit easing, and the markets so far has greeted the possibility with a renewed sell-off in FTSE 100. ECB is also expected to up the ante with another QE extension sometime later this year, and the European equities do not seem overjoyed about it. To contrast, S&P 500 seems pretty much nonchalant about a plausible Fed hike. The usual QE-led risk rally, it appears, are drawing to an end. In fact a few are already calling out for a regime change - from QE to deflation dominance (or lack of demand).

In the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, most central bank carried out a massive amount of monetary stimulus. One way to track the global monetary stimulus beyond policy rates is to track the combined balance sheet of major central banks¹, as we see below.

Few would argue against the unprecedented monetary stimulus led mostly by the Fed which served a crucial purpose during and after the crisis to restore confidence, liquidity and growth conditions. However, the effectiveness of QEs from other central banks have arguably been much weaker. ECB QE is so far hardly "successful".

Also, over time, the impact to real economy has grown visibly less dramatic. Below chart (left one) shows the growth in global major central bank balance sheet  vis-à-vis growth in M2 money supply as well as bank lending across major economies². Since the abatement of the European Sovereign Crisis in Q3 2012, all the measures have started moving in lock-step. What is more, the magnitude of global M2 growth has been lower than central bank balance sheet growth, meaning less bang for the QE bucks. The bank lending growth has been even lower than that. It is hardly a surprise we started to have quite a bit of noise around the effectiveness of QE and monetary stimulus around that time and since.

It is not hard to see why. As the right hand chart³ shows, irrespective of what the central banks have been doing, the global private sector still continues with deleveraging (with some exception, like US corporates). The excess savings - especially for Euro area (and a large contraction in dis-savings in the US as well) clearly underscores the problem. This arguably is an expected outcome of a balance sheet recession - wherein the private sector, afflicted with too much debt and in a process to repair their balance sheet, will try to increase savings and desist from borrowing no matter how low the lending rates are pushed down by QE. This is less a question about pricing and more about the capacity and willingness to borrow. On top, the increased regulatory burdens and negative interest rates certainly did not help the banking sector much to upsize their loan books. The combined effect - anemic global demand and as a result, stunted global investments (not helped by pre-crisis built-up over-capacity in certain sectors) - was given a new moniker, secular stagnation.

Economies can be stimulated using many forms and jargon. But in any case, to boost demand it must work to enable the demand side to afford it. And this increase demand must be paid for by either increased debt (i.e. borrowing) or equity (like increased transfer or wage). Monetary policy, in practice, mostly tend to fund this increased demand through debt in its standard transmission channel through banks. In a scenario where many are focused on reducing leverage, it is no surprise that this will have a less-than-expected impact. Monetary policy can enhanced equity based spending as well, like through wealth effect or inducing an increase in wage through increased inflation expectation. While this has worked in the US, for the rest of the world, especially in Euro Area and in Japan, this has hardly been the case. The dis-inflation remains very much alive.

There are some recent trends, however, that is slowly becoming a theme - and it involves the other side of the stimulus coin. 2015 has been the first year after the extra-ordinary time during the crisis, that major global economies have experienced a reversal of a combined fiscal tightening (see below⁴ on the left). We are past the fiascoes like sales tax hike in Japan and the excessive focus on balanced budget in Europe. And a few countries like Canada and Japan have already stated fiscal stimulus as their explicit policy tools. US may see similar moves after the election. Of course the downside of the government playing the role of "consumer of the last resort" is that this comes at a cost of debt concentration at government sector. 

We are on a cusp right now. Global consumption, despite all the allegation, has shown considerable resilience (although much away from their pre-crisis period, see chart⁵ above on the right). What we want now, more than ever, is avoiding any policy mistake. Given the fragile nature and very low margin of error on the policy side, it will be hard to recover from one. We are past the days of equity rallies with every new round of monetary easing. Markets will focus more and more on the underlying growth. This growth will of course have some costs - the key policy issue will be how to allocate that in a balanced manner between the fiscal and monetary side of this. One-sided efforts from central banks - increasingly larger asset purchase from a rather finite pool in a world characterized by negative interest rates and safe asset shortage - is perhaps past its used-by date.

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1. source: national central banks
2. source: national central banks, IMF, Bloomberg
3. source: national statistics offices, IMF
4. source: national statistics offices, national central banks
5. source: national statistics offices, Bloomberg

Macro: Revisting The Dog That Did Not Bark

Very recently we have seen some rising voices on the upside inflation possibilities from various corners.  Soberlook covered it the other day. Deutsche has recently had a rather strong publication. Even the St Louis Fed has something to say on this. I am not so sure that inflation is just around the corner, but I have also covered it before (See here,here, here and here). The point is not to say we should worry about rising inflation now. The forecasting accuracy of economists are, well, not certain. And hence as market participants, investors should care about other possibilities than just their beliefs. Even when (and perhaps especially when) they tend to diverge. And these points are valid concerns to juxtapose against a general deflation concern, driven by Chinese and European economies.

The major points raised in favor of a more positive outlook on inflation are broadly 

• the recent rising inflation in the US
• the subdued wage inflation may be just a lagging indicator, and when corrected for productivity gain, unit labor cost inflation may be higher 
• inflation markets are too pessimistic about oil and finally 
• fighting deflation may be unproven, but fighting inflation is not easy either. 

Let's look at some charts to see where we stand on this. To start with, what is driving the recent pick up in inflation  in the US (click to enlarge)

Yes, it has been mostly driven by a recovery in the transport (read energy) component, and steady housing and healthcare components. The massive fall in oil price in late 2014 skewed the transport component and if oil steadies at these levels, this major effect will cancel out (as the Fed expects).

However, that is no cause of merriment, looking at a broader picture. As alleged, the wage rise has indeed been subdued, to historical standard. And as pointed out by numerous analysts, the traditional Philips curve has been much weaker (the chart on the right shows correlation to wage growth and inflation, with shaded area as US recession). Oil, and in general commodities have, in recent times, much stronger correlation to inflation that wage growth. Now this can be read as you like. One hand this means even an increase in wage may not reflect in a substantial increase in inflation (argued from the supply side, with so much excess capacity in the commodity sectors, which most analysts generally agree upon). On the other hand, notice the case of the early 90s recession and how the wage and inflation correlation picked up during the late stage of the recovery. As I have mentioned before, the current recovery is not entirely unlike that of this one.

The take-away here is wage growth or not, the supply side excesses will have to run its course before it can put pressure on commodity prices (perhaps not much downside from here, at the same time). What we really should try to figure out is what is the health of the demand side.

And here we see the mixed signals, especially if we consider the global point of view. Below charts shows GDP-weighted headline and core (ex-energy) inflation. While we have a strong recovery in the US, the rest of the world does not look that impressive at all. It is true we are not very much near a deflation scenario given the current levels, but not a fat lot of improvement in sight.

The point here is more nuanced than worrying about either deflation or inflation. On one hand we should remind ourselves not to write of return of inflation. On the other, we may not be near deflation, but that situation may change drastically if we face a sudden crisis. Given the current monetary and fiscal policy stance, it is very hard to see the wriggle room. And that is precisely the reason to worry for risk assets. Given status quo we should do fine. But in either case it is hard to see a fitting policy response that is credible and effective in either way. It is more like a short convexity trade. If you are in it, you better make sure you are getting paid for it.

Finally, yes, the oil market is indeed pricing the scenarios too pessimistically. But it is hardly fair to blame the traders. You may as well know the breakeven levels are likely wrong, but if you have stop losses it is hard to fight all in. Similar in rates markets. Understandably,  the Sterling markets, with all Brexit talks warming up, are not very optimistic compared to Euro. But given the inflation difference and fundamentals, this is likely a mis-pricing too. At the same time, how long the USD 10y can maintain a 100bps+ differential to Euro rates without attracting yield chasers. The table shows three month forward curves across markets and the policy action priced in.

Today	EUR	GBP	USD	JPY
Current	-0.34%	0.51%	0.49%	-0.03%
Max	1.49%	1.88%	2.42%	1.42%
Long-run average	0.98%	1.27%	2.22%	1.26%
Next Hike	Mar-19	Mar-19	Jun-16	Dec-21
Initial Hiking Pace	8.3	7.4	6.9	4.5
Peak Time	Mar-29	Mar-27	Mar-33	Mar-34

Eventually all these will correct, may be sooner than later. But rather than being directional, it is time to see how to position for the volatility when we edge towards either extreme and the market overreacts. I would rather like to sit on gun powder now than trying to cover later.

I think this entire arguments and counter arguments are nicely captured in this Galilean dialogues from Gavyn Davis on FT.

For title reference see this and this.

Note to Self: The Peking Swan?

What are the probabilities of a Yuan devaluation in the range of 10%.? And given this may happen next week or next quarter or any time*, how to trade this and not bleed to death on carry?

 

The officialease from Beijing, indicating an apparent strong stance against this and favor for a stable currency, would have been highly suspicious, had it not been China. As for China doing a volt face, this will have a mighty kill radius. The swan may not resemble any before in recent past, alive or roasted.

 

Or it may happen much less dramatically in a series of devaluation-cum-depreciation (the much more likely case), which will have relatively benign impact on the markets in the short term but prime it up for more to follow. This can undermine PBoC.

 

The question is how best to position for this. Rates - may be, Equities - difficult to run the position for long time, Commodities - Oil in contago, but not in super-contago yet, FX - may be. Need to look closer.

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* The Uncertainty Principle, as applied to macro investing, says you cannot forecast the direction and exact timing of an even simultaneously.

Macro: The Chinese New Year

The gyrating market this week so far has more than done its bit to jolt people out of their holiday stupor. The Chinese equity markets and the law makers kept everyone, well, engaged. Late this afternoon we have seen some respite after the Chinese authorities repelled the stock circuit breaker rules. Equities rallied from day's low and bonds sold off. All fine and good. The question is, is it time to fade the market full of confused and panicked investors? Or should you panic yourself instead.

 

Whether the Chinese episode is something to worry about depends on the opinion about how in control the Chinese policy makers are, and what is their line of thinking. Chinese Yuan devaluation is not necessarily such a risk-off thing in itself. Arguably the Chinese authority looks at CNY against a trade-weighted baskets and not only dollars. And also in terms real effective exchange rates, Yuan is far from cheap, and a bit of regression to the mean (at whatever the authorities think it should be) should not cause so much pandemonium. Then again, it is not clear how much control the authorities have in executing these changes. Last year, and this year so far, most of the Yuan "devaluation" has been rather abrupt. This may be the communication policy of PBoC. But apparently that did not go well with the market. The re-balancing problem in China is a real thing. And it is just that, a re-balancing problem. If it can be controlled, with controlled devaluation and a smooth transition from investment based to consumption based GDP, and most importantly manage the debt from blowing off in between, this will be an adjustment.

 

If it is not controlled, it will be a crisis. Some are already calling it so. I tend to think it is not. Referring to someone who knows more about China than perhaps anyone else, there are encouraging signs in this rebalancing effort. The Chinese foreign exchange reserve is a hot issue in near terms. But more importantly, it is how they maintain the balance in the economy (low enough unemployment and no mass-bankruptcies) before they adjust to the new GDP paradigm is the most important question. And FX devaluation is a pretty smart and cheap way to achieve that. At a milder cost of a negative pressure on global inflation. Unless that creates a panic and becomes a self-fulfilling crisis.

 

Market seems to be focused on the second point of FX devaluation, fed by researches on where the level official reserve is and how much outflow it has seen in recent time. Remember how the Chinese market sold off massively in the June and rest of the world hardly noticed? And when that reversed in August when the PBoC revised CNY fixings. The question is how justified this fixation on FX is. The political economy in China is pretty much different than the developed nation or what we have seen in case of the Asian tigers or LatAms under sudden stop, The authorities, in principle, has much wider control on the economy. And if they do succumb to the sudden stop problem and that blows in to a full scale crisis with a collapse of asset prices, it will be felt far more geopolitically, than economically (apart from a certain global deflation, again). I would tend to assume so far what we have seen from the policy-makers are more likely to be mistakes and experiments than a sign of loss of control.

 

In the meanwhile, coming back to the original question, should to panic or fade? Statistically speaking, the odds are something like below (click to enlarge).

 

The charts shows the conditional upside and downside in representative equities after a given amount of weekly sell-off (the opportunity is the difference between upside and downside). It captures the next week's percentage move (vertical axis) given a percentage sell-off this week (x-axis). As we can see, with extreme moves come extreme opportunities. Equities so far sold off around 4% to 5% this week across markets. As you can see the time to jump in to wanton bullishness is still a couple of percentage points away, statistically speaking.

 

Note: these data sets excludes the wild days of 2008, but including them does not change the picture much.

Five things I do not believe in...

But have no evidence to the contrary. Yet.

1. That the dealers are running zero corporate bond inventories
2. That China shorts is going to make money for investors (UPDATE: At least not in macro shorts. Possibly in selective equity shorts. There seems to be a fissure within the old and the new economy in China)
3. That the next crisis (whenever that happens) will mean a dollar rally (against euro) (UPDATE: See this, although I think it misses the point. It is about in what currencies global assets and liabilities are funded)
4. That migration crisis is just another one for Europe
5. That we have reached the peak Geo-political crisis (think about power balance in post-oil scarcity world)

Inflation: Think Global (In Chart)

A few observation on inflation from a global perspective

#1: Global inflation has been weak, but core has been steady. Here the global data points (like headline or core inflation) are calculated using the GDP weighted national measures of the top 20 countries in terms of GDP in current dollars (representing 79.9% of world GDP. Pareto!!).

The difference between the core measure and the headline is even more important as the wedge between them is currently driven mostly by a single factor - energy prices. The concept of inflation is an overall price rise. A change in a particular component is mostly a relative price change, not an overall price change. Central banks have little controls over production of individual goods and services. If there is a large relative price rise for doughnuts for some reason, a hike in policy rates most probably is not going to help it (unless this relative price rise permeates through the economy and finally in wage expectation through second round effect).

#2: The smack-down of inflation in commodity exporting countries is most prominent for the ones with fixed exchange rate regimes. With a few exceptions, most of the metal and energy exporters are not suffering any great dis-inflationary pressure in core measures otherwise.

#3: In terms of professional forecasts, inflation expectation remains steady, but the market based measures for the US are not so. 

#4: The consumer demand is weak. Especially if we measure in dollar terms. We have a scenario of low rates, a strong dollar, very weak commodity prices and weak global demand. Commodity prices respond a lot to investments expenditure globally. However, the consumption expenditure has been a relatively stable component of economies across countries and time historically. Since mid of last year the consumption expenditure globally in dollar term has been in a strong contraction phase, approx 6% from peak till Q2 2015. This is only matched by an approx 8% drop during the GFC. And this is not driven by US or China much, rather rest of the world, including Euro area and Japan. It is hard to say if this has bottomed out and we will see the savings from drop in energy prices being channelized to recover consumer demand. 

Nonetheless, the possibility of a wage driven inflationary pressure cannot be dismissed. The chart on the left shows scatter plot of job opening rate (JOLT), Employment Cost Index and PCE core inflation against headline unemployment rate on x-axis, since 1980. The starting points are marked in red and end points in green. As we see in case of job opening, there has been some significant hysterisis (unemployment rate higher, given the job opening, if we measure the slope from the earlier part of the curve). This may points to a case of structural problem in unemployment. That will put forth a case against a downward revision of Fed's unemployment target (NAIRU). On the other hand the wage inflation (here ECI) and broader inflation (PCE) still shows inverse relationship. The Phillips curve is still alive (esp. for wage inflation), although flatter in recent times. Given the fact that Fed action has always a lag before it affects the real economy, this will keep the case for a early hike on the table.

#5: And related to above point of global consumption, the global imbalance in excess savings seem to be heading towards a forced reduction. The left chart shows excess savings (or equivalently current account balance) in nominal dollar terms. As we can see the large CA deficit of US has historically been balanced by large surplus of Japan and lately China. The EM had a spike just after the late 90s Asian Crisis. But that is mostly negated now. The recent cause of concern (Euro Glut) was a large and ballooning surplus of Euro Area. With the fall in oil prices, the Petrodollar balance is now going the other way to counter it. These low commodity prices may play a crucial role in re-balancing the flow of trades and capital across the globe. ( it is evident from the chart that trade volume has come down significantly.) It is not clear to what extent this balancing act will help consumption and through what channel, but it is definitely better than exploding imbalances in the medium to long term.

Also since the financial crisis, after the very initial period, it has been mostly a battle fought by central bankers, with fiscal stimulus sitting mostly on the sideline. In fact the withdrawal of high fiscal stimulus just after the collapse might as well have countered central bank efforts. We are politically getting in a better position to consider and use fiscal stimulus than the height of European Crisis and talks of austerity. The global budget balance is in fact back to the pre-crisis average level. And if the economy is not, there is a good reason and scope for fiscal stimulus in coming years.

The key takeaways: Despite the weak global demands and large savings imbalance (which are related), there is a case that the commodity prices has done some corrections, and a persistent weak demand/ high global excess savings may not be realized. And we still have the upside of fiscal stimulus in case consumer demand needed a booster does. At a global level, most measures of core inflation, and non-market based inflation expectation remains robust. However, the market seems to be pricing a very pessimistic outlook for inflation globally. And also as mentioned earlier the inflation skew pricings are improving on the upside surprise.

Is this a case of peak (dis-)inflation worries and significant consolidation and upside from here. Hard to be sure, but I would say chances are good than they were before. Of course inflation can go either way from here, but in most scenarios they have a better chance of ending up higher than current levels. And a reasonable dollar weakness from here can tilt the balance in its favor further.

Trades

1) In case Fed is on time (which we will only know with the benefit of hind sight): long inflation upside and nominal rates sell-off with short dollar for cheapening.

2) In case Fed is delayed: long vol - a sharper rate of hike will catch many unsuspecting asset classes on the wrong foot.